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AI and advanced automation are involved in almost all aspects of our life. In the interaction with such systems, human 
causal responsibility for the outcomes becomes equivocal. We analyze the descriptive abilities of a newly developed 
responsibility quantification model (ResQu) to predict actual human responsibility and perceptions of responsibility in the 
interaction with intelligent systems. In two laboratory experiments, participants performed a classification task, and were 
aided by binary automated classification systems with different capabilities. We compared the theoretical responsibility 
values, predicted by the ResQu model, to the actual measured responsibility participants took on and to their subjective 
ranking of responsibility. The ResQu model predictions were strongly correlated with both measured and subjective 
responsibility. The model generally provided quite accurate predictions of the actual values of the measured responsibility. 
A bias existed only when participants’ classification capabilities were much worse than those of the automated 
classification system. In this case, the participants overestimated their own capabilities, relied less-than-optimally on the 
automated system and assumed greater-than-optimal responsibility. The results demonstrate the value of the ResQu model 
as a descriptive model, considering some systematic deviations. It is possible to compute a ResQu model score to predict 
behavior or perceptions of responsibility, taking into account the characteristics of the human, the intelligent system and 
the environment. The ResQu model provides a new quantitative method that may aid system design and guide policy and 
legal decisions, regarding human responsibility in events involving intelligent systems. 
CCS Concepts: • Human-centered computing → Human computer interaction (HCI) → HCI theory, concepts and models; 
Empirical studies in HCI; Laboratory experiments • Information systems →Decision support systems  
• Applied computing → Operations research→ Decision analysis • Mathematics of computing → Information theory  
KEYWORDS 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Artificial intelligence (AI) and advanced automation have become major parts of our life. They are prominent in finance 
(e.g., algorithmic trading), banking (e.g., automatic credit approvals), transportation (e.g., autonomous vehicles), medicine 
(e.g., advanced, data-based decision support), military settings (e.g., autonomous weapon systems), industry (e.g., 
automated production facilities), and other domains. In these systems, computers and humans share the collection and 
evaluation of information, decision-making and action implementation.  
In intelligent systems or with high-level automation, the human comparative responsibility becomes equivocal. For 
instance, what is the human responsibility when all information about an event arrives through a system that collects and 
analyzes data from multiple sources, without the human having any independent information? If a human performs an 
action, the system indicated as necessary, is the human responsible for the outcome of the action, if it caused harm?   
The determination of the human causal responsibility is particularly important in the design and investigation of 
intelligent systems that can lead to injury and even death, such as autonomous vehicles, automated use of hazardous 
materials in industry or autonomous weapon systems. 
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So far, the subject of human responsibility was investigated mainly from philosophical, ethical, moral or legal 
perspectives, but much less from the perspective of cognitive engineering of human interaction with intelligent systems. 
To address this, we developed a theoretical Responsibility Quantification model (ResQu model) of human responsibility 
in intelligent systems [Douer and Meyer 2019]. The ResQu model allows us to compute a responsibility measure for causal 
human responsibility in the interaction with intelligent systems. This theoretical measure predicts the average share of 
unique human contribution to the overall outcomes, based on different characteristics of the operational environment, the 
system and the human, and the allocation of functions between them. 
The ResQu model is a normative model. It assumes perfect rationality on the part of the human, perfect knowledge 
about probabilities and properties of the system and optimal human utilization of the system. However, in reality, people 
may act non-optimally when they interact with intelligent systems and automation [Alvarado-Valencia and Barrero 2014, 
Arnott 2006, Baker et al. 2004, Goddard et al. 2011, Mosier et al. 1998, Parasuraman and Riley 1997]. This raises the 
question whether this normative model can also serve as a descriptive model for predicting actual human behavior. 
To address this question, we conducted, in this study, two controlled experiments in which participants interacted with 
a simple decision support system in the controlled settings of a laboratory. Based on the observed behavior, we computed 
the measured responsibility, defined as the observed average share of unique human contribution to the outcomes. We 
compared these scores to the corresponding theoretical ResQu predictions for the different experimental conditions.  
Responsibility is also a psychological phenomenon. People may perceive their contribution to a process differently 
from their actual contribution. Thus, it is also important to analyze the relation between subjective perceptions and both 
theoretical and measured responsibilities. To do so, we asked participants about their subjective evaluations of their 
contributions, and we computed an average score of subjective responsibility, which we compared to the corresponding 
theoretical and measured responsibility values.  
Fig. 1 summarizes the descriptions and properties of the three responsibility measures we use in this paper. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Descriptions and properties of theoretical, measured, and subjective responsibility 
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2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
2.1 Human Responsibility in the Interaction with Intelligent Systems 
Philosophical and legal research includes extensive studies on the concept of responsibility, investigating its different 
aspects [Hart & Honor 1985, Hart 2008, Vincent 2011]. In the domain of human interaction with intelligent systems, role 
responsibility refers to assigning specific roles and duties to the human for which the human is accountable to others. 
However, this role assignment does not specify the causal relations between the human’s actions and the overall 
consequences and outcomes. This relation is better defined by causal responsibility, which describes the actual human 
contribution to combined human-machine system outcomes.  
The ability to control a system and the resulting consequences is a necessary condition for assigning causal 
responsibility [Noorman 2014]. As the level of system intelligence increases, there is a shift towards shared control, in 
which the human and computerized systems jointly make decisions or control actions [Abbink et al. 2018]. These are 
combined to generate a final control action or decision. There may also be supervisory control, in which the human sets 
high-level goals, monitors the system and only intervenes if necessary. Moreover, in advanced systems, which incorporate 
artificial intelligence, machine-learning and neural networks, developers and users may be unable to fully control or predict 
all possible behaviors and outcomes, since their internal structure can be opaque (a “black box”) and sometimes can yield 
odd and counterintuitive results [Castelvecchi 2016, Scharre 2016]. Consequently, humans may no longer be able to control 
intelligent systems sufficiently to be rightly considered fully responsible for their outcomes. The intelligent system (or its 
developers) may share some of the responsibility [Johnson and Powers 2005, Coeckelbergh 2012], in a manner that 
resembles the legal concept of comparative responsibility, a doctrine of tort law that divides fault among different parties 
[Cooter & Ulen 1986, Pinto 1978, Sobelsohn 1984]. This difficulty to determine the human’s responsibility when using 
highly intelligent systems leads to a “responsibility gap” in the ability to divide causal responsibility between humans and 
the system [Docherty et. al. 2012, Johnson 2014, Matthias 2004].  
The rapid developments in intelligent systems have raised concerns that humans will become less and less involved in 
their use and thus will be considered or feel less responsible for adverse outcomes [Crootof 2015, Cummings 2006]. This 
prompted a demand to involve humans in automated processes in a manner that will facilitate meaningful human control 
[Santoni & Van den Hoven 2018]. This is the case, for example, with advanced weapon systems, in which the issue of 
“meaningful human control” has become a key topic in discussions [Crootof 2016, Heyns 2016, Horowitz and Scharre 
2015, Neslage 2015, UNIDIR 2014]. However, simply putting a human into the loop does not assure that the human will 
have meaningful control. There may be cases when the human cannot knowledgably supervise the system, or when the 
human has to make decisions, based exclusively on input from automated functions that one cannot evaluate independently 
[Pritchett, Kim, & Feigh 2014]. Currently, there are different, and sometimes contradicting interpretations and policies 
regarding meaningful human involvement, and system designers lack models and metrics to systematically address this 
issue [Canellas & Haga 2015]. 
The theoretical ResQu model we developed aimed to bridge the responsibility gap, by enabling us to divide the causal 
responsibility for outcomes between the human and the intelligent system. Using information theory, it defines a 
quantitative measure of the expected share of the unique human contribution to the overall outcomes, based on the 
characteristics of the operational environment, the system and the human, and the function allocation between them. In 
addition, it can be used to quantify the level of meaningful human control, based on the premise that meaningful human 
control requires the human to have some causal responsibility for the outcomes.  
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2.2 The ResQu Model formulation for Binary Classification Systems 
In the current study we examined the ability of the ResQu model to describe human behavior in the interaction with 
automated decision support systems that perform binary classifications. Binary classification systems and binary alerts that 
warn the user about abnormal conditions or about the value of a variable exceeding some threshold are the simplest form 
of intelligent systems. These systems are the most widely used decision aid, used in flight decks, industrial control rooms, 
vehicles, medical equipment, computer-aided diagnostic systems, smart homes, and many other computerized and AI 
systems [Bregman 2010, Cicirelli et al. 2016, Doi 2007, Jalalian et al. 2013, Meiring 2015, Meyer 2001, Meyer 2004, 
Pritchett 2009, Robles et al. 2010, Vashitz et al. 2009].  
The advantage of analyzing binary classification systems is that, in this case, the ResQu model is reduced to relatively 
simple calculations and interpretations [Douer and Meyer 2019], which also simplifies the empirical examination of the 
effects of different human and system characteristics on responsibility. 
Let X denote the binary set of the action alternatives for the human user, and Y denote the binary classification set for 
the system. Then, the ResQu model defines human responsibility as 
 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝(𝑋) ≝ ு(௑/௒)
ு(௑)
 = ு(௑,௒)ିு(௑)
ு(௑)
                                                         (1) 
where H(X) is Shannon's entropy, which is a measure of uncertainty related to a discrete random  
variable X  
𝐻(𝑋) = − ∑ 𝑝(𝑥)𝑙𝑜𝑔ଶ𝑝(𝑥)௫∈ఞ                                                                 (2) 
and H(X/Y) is the conditional entropy, which is a measure of the remaining uncertainty about a variable X when a variable 
Y is known.  
𝐻(𝑋/𝑌) = − ∑ 𝑝(𝑦) ∑ 𝑝(𝑥/𝑦)௫∈ఞ 𝑙𝑜𝑔ଶ𝑝(𝑥/𝑦)௬∈ఊ                                                  (3) 
The ratio Resp(X) quantifies the expected exclusive share of the human in determining the action selection variable X, 
given the system’s classification Y. By definition, Resp(X) ∈ [0,1]. Resp(X)=1 if, and only if, the human action selection 
X is independent from the system’s classification result Y, in which case the human is fully responsible for the system 
output. Resp(Z)=0 if, and only if, Y completely determines X, in which case the human actions are exclusively determined 
by the system’s classifications, so the human’s comparative responsibility is zero.  
2.3 Signal Detection Theory for Modeling Aided Decision Making   
In the current study, we used the framework of signal detection theory (SDT) [Green & Swets 1966] to analyze human 
responsibility in decision aids, such as binary classification systems and alerts. Signal detection theory was used both to 
analytically compute ResQu model predictions of human responsibility and to analyze observed responsibility.  
In terms of signal detection theory, aided decision making is the combined performance of two detectors, the human 
and the alert system [Maltz & Meyer 2001, Meyer 2001, Meyer and Ballas 1997, Sorkin 1988, Sorkin and Woods 1985]. 
Both detectors obtain some information on the state of the environment, which is probabilistically related to the actual state 
of the environment. The two sources are imperfectly correlated, because otherwise they would be redundant.  
According to SDT, in the settings of binary alert systems, each detector has a certain detection sensitivity which is 
usually defined as the distance between the means of the Signal and Noise distributions, measured in standard deviations. 
We will denote by d’A and d’H the detection sensitivities of the alert and the human. The larger the detection sensitivity, 
the easier it is for the detector to distinguish between signals and noise. The alert system has a preset response criterion, 
denoted by β A, which is used to determine its output by comparing the input value to a cutoff point. The binary output of 
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the alert system serves as additional input for the human. The human combines the information from the alert system with 
additional information the human has and responds accordingly.  
In SDT humans observe an ambiguous stimulus (which will be referred to as the continuous information) and have to 
decide to which of two possible categories it belongs - “signal” or “noise”. It is customary to refer to the rare event that 
needs to be detected (a cyberattack, a malfunction, a pathology, a crime, etc.) as the signal. When the human works alone, 
without the use of a decision aid, the optimal human response criterion, β H, that maximizes the expected value of the 
payoffs is given by: 
𝛽ு
∗ =  ଵି௉ೞ
௉ೞ
௏೅ಿି௏ಷು
௏೅ುି௏ಷಿ
                                                                                  (4) 
Where pS is the signal probability,  1- pS is the noise probability, and VTN, VFP, VTP, and VFN  are the values for True Negative 
(correctly responding “noise”), False Positive (falsely responding “signal”), True Positive (correctly responding “signal”) 
and False Negative (falsely responding “noise”), respectively.  
When using a binary alert system, the human should judge the values of the continuous variable with different response 
criteria, depending on the output of the system [Robinson & Sorkin 1985]. The different criteria are computed by replacing 
pS, in equation 4, with pS|A (the conditional probability of a signal, given an alert) or pS|NA (the conditional probability of a 
signal, given that there was no alert). When using a reliable alert system, the posterior probability for a signal is larger 
when an alarm is issued, and is smaller when no alarm is issued, pS|A ≥  pS ≥  pS|NA. In this case, the user should adopt a 
lower cutoff point when an alarm is issued (i.e., increase the tendency to declare a signal) and a higher cutoff point when 
no alarm is issued (i.e., increase the tendency to declare a noise).  
2.4 Signal Detection Measures for Trust, Compliance and Reliance in Aided Decision Making    
The above theoretical SDT formulation assumed a best-case scenario of perfect rationality on the part of the human, 
perfect human knowledge of the alert system’s properties and optimal human utilization of information. Under these 
assumptions, the computed human responsibility is optimal, given the properties of the system. However, in reality, people 
may act non-optimally with intelligent systems and automation, by misusing, disusing, and abusing the automation 
[Alvarado-Valencia and Barrero 2014, Arnott 2006, Baker et al. 2004, Goddard et al. 2011, Mosier et al. 1998, Parasuraman 
and Riley 1997]. 
Human trust in the automation, which reflects the human’s attitude toward the system, is a major factor that influences 
how people use the automation in real-life  [Lee and See 2004]. Thus, it has become a central issue in the study of automated 
systems [Lee and Moray 1994, Muir and Moray 1996, Meyer and Lee 2013, Meyer et al. 2014]. The human trust in 
automated systems is influenced by factors associated with the human (e.g., culture, age, gender, cognitive and emotional 
factors, self-efficacy, expertise, workload, etc.), factors associated with the automated system (e.g., reliability, types of 
errors, usefulness, feedback, design features, etc.), and factors associated with the environment (mainly the predictability 
of  the environment)   [Alvarado-Valencia and Barrero 2014, Hoff and Bashir 2015, Schaefer et al. 2016, Sutherland et al. 
2015, Sutherland et al. 2016]. 
There are two different responses to alerts, reliance and compliance [Meyer 2001]. Compliance describes the response 
when an alert was issued, whether true or false. A compliant operator will rapidly switch attention from the current activity 
to the alert and will initiate a response. Reliance refers to the operator state when the alert system is silent, signaling “all is 
well”. Reliant operators will allocate resources to other tasks, relying on the automation to let them know when a problem 
occurs [Dixon and Wickens 2006]. Compliance and reliance are somewhat independent responses that are affected by 
different factors [Meyer 2004]. 
In previous studies of human trust in automated systems, the human perception and behavior have been assessed 
through subjective ratings of trust, together with measuring the proportion of times during which the automation was used 
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[e.g., Muir & Moray 1996] or by assessing the probability of detecting automation failures [e.g. Mosier et al. 1998]. 
However, one can use the SDT-based measures as an alternative method for quantifying human trust, compliance and 
reliance, in the interaction with binary classification systems [Meyer 2001, Meyer and Lee 2013].  
The human’s differential adjustment of the cutoff points to the output of the alert system is directly related to the level 
of human trust and responsibility. When the human uses a single cutoff point, regardless of indications from the alert 
system, he or she obviously ignores the alert system’s indications and has no trust in the system. The use of different cutoff 
points indicates that the human considers the information from the alert system when making a decision. The larger the 
difference between the cutoffs, the greater the trust and the weight the human gives to the information from the alert system. 
The levels of human reliance and compliance can be assessed, respectively, by the distance of the human cutoff point from 
zero and from the optimal corresponding value, when the alert indicated an alarm or that “all is well”. 
Another SDT measure related to human trust is the effective d’, denoted by d’eff, which reflects the overall detection 
sensitivity, based on the combined detection capabilities of the alert system and the human. For a binary alert system, the 
maximal value of d’eff , that the human can attain, can be approximated by [Meyer and Kuchar 2019]: 
 𝑑′௘௙௙ = ඥ𝑑′ுଶ + 𝑑′஺ଶ − 0.3𝑑′ுଶ 𝑑′஺ଶ                                                                                  (5) 
When the human under-trusts the alert system, the human will combine information from the alert system in a non-
optimal way, giving less weight to the system’s indications. In this case, the empirical value of d’eff  would be lower, and 
closer to the human’s own detection sensitivity, d’H, than to the maximal optimal value.   
To conclude, differences between the optimal theoretical values and the empirical values of the cutoff differences and 
the effective d’ indicate non-optimal user trust in the alert system, which may lead to non-optimal user behaviors, such as 
over- or under-reliance and compliance. In the current study we used both SDT measures (i.e. the cutoff differences and 
the effective d’) to investigate the underlying causes for differences between theoretical and measured responsibility.    
 
3 EXPERIMENT 1: THE EFFECT OF 𝒅′ ON HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY 
3.1 Introduction and Objectives 
According to the ResQu model, the relative abilities of the human and the intelligent system are the main determinants of 
the human’s responsibility. When the system’s ability exceeds that of the human, the human’s unique contribution 
diminishes, leading to low human responsibility. Conversely, when the human’s ability exceeds that of the system, the 
human’s responsibility will be high. When aided by an alert system, the relative abilities of the human and the alert are 
described by their detection sensitivities.   
Experiment 1 examined the ability of the ResQu model to predict human behavior and perceptions of responsibility 
for different combinations of the human’s and the alert’s detection sensitivities (d’H and d’A, respectively). 
The objectives of the experiment were:  
(1) To examine whether d'A, d'H, or their interaction, have significant effects on the measured and subjective 
responsibility, as predicted by the ResQu model (against the null hypothesis that they have no effect), and 
specifically that human responsibility decreases in d'A, and increases in d'H. 
(2) To examine how close the values of the empirical responsibility are to the theoretical values and to analyze sources 
for differences by using SDT measures of trust (difference between cutoffs and effective d’). 
(3)  To examine the relations between measured and subjective responsibilities. 
(4)  To examine whether the subjective responsibility estimates differ between self and another agent (against the 
null hypothesis that they do not). 
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3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Selection of Experimental points 
We generated four experimental combinations, by assigning the human and the alert system either low detection 
sensitivity (d'H, d'A = 1) or high detection sensitivity (d'H, d'A = 2.3). We also assumed that both the human and the system 
have similar incentives regarding the outcomes and use the same response criterion (β H = β A=1). We computed the 
theoretical responsibility value for each of the four combinations with the ResQu model [Douer and Meyer 2019].   
Fig. 2 depicts the model predictions of  the theoretical responsibility values at the four points used in the experimental. 
The points differ in the human’s and the alert’s detection sensitivities.  
 
 
Fig. 2. The ResQu model’s responsibility values for the four experimental combinations 
 
An advantage of the selected experimental points is that they represent considerably different values of theoretical 
responsibilities, spanning over a wide range, from as low as 12% to as high as 87%. 
 
3.2.2.Participants 
Participants were 60 students from Tel Aviv University (ages 20-49, median 24, 62% females), of which 53 were 
undergraduate students and 48 belonged to the faculty of engineering. They were recruited through E-mail invitations and 
a post on a university webpage that serves to recruit students for experiments. We assigned the participants randomly to 
one of the four experimental subgroups, so that we had 15 participants in each subgroup. Each participant received 40 
Israeli New Shekels [ILS], about US $12, for taking part in the experiment. Conscientious performance of the task was 
encouraged by the promise of an additional monetary award (100 ILS, about US $29) to a randomly selected participant in 
each of the experimental groups, using the accumulated individual scores as weights for the selection. 
3.2.3. Apparatus 
The experiment was conducted on desktop computers, with Intel® i7 3.4 GHZ Processor, 8 GB RAM, NVIDIA® GeForce 
GT 610 Video Card, and 23-inch (56-cm) monitors. The experimental program was written in Python.  
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Fig. 2 shows a schematic depiction of the experimental screen. It consisted of a 20 cm high and wide square at the 
center of the screen. Above the square were two fields, labeled “Total Score” and “Last Trial”, which displayed the 
cumulative number of points and the number of points that were gained or lost in the last trial.  
The experimental continuous stimulus was a rectangle, displayed for 30 seconds inside the large square. The rectangle 
had a fixed width, but its height varied. The height was sampled from one of two distributions of long and short rectangles. 
In each trial, participants had to decide whether the rectangle was from the long or the short distribution. Similar to a 
method used in previous studies [Meyer 2001], in each trial the rectangle appeared at a different position inside the large 
square to make it more difficult for participants to mark the cutoff point explicitly by, for instance, placing their finger on 
the screen.  
The experimental binary stimulus from the alert system was a small square, located at the top of the screen, that could 
have one of two possible colors, either red (F44141 Hex color code), indicating an alert, or green (4EF442 Hex color code), 
indicating that there was no alert. The binary alert stimulus appeared together with the rectangle stimulus, and it remained 
visible while the rectangle was shown.  
Participants responded by clicking with the mouse on either the “Accept” or the “Reject” button at the bottom of the 
screen, according to whether they thought that the rectangle belonged to the longer or the shorter distribution. After the 
response, the payoff for the trial appeared in the “Last Trial” field, and the “Score” field was updated. An additional 
feedback message, stating either “correct” or “incorrect”, appeared for 2 seconds, and then the next trial began. 
 
Fig. 3. A schematic depiction of the experimental screen. The figure presents an example in which there is an alert (the alert field is red), 
the cumulative number of points is 20, the participant chose a correct response in the last trial, which awarded an additional point. 
3.3. Procedure and Design 
The experiment was conducted in the “Interaction with Technology (IwiT) Lab” of the Industrial Engineering department 
at Tel Aviv University on groups of up to 7 participants. Each participant sat at a computer.  
The instructions stated that the experiment is a simplified simulation of a quality control task in a factory. A certain 
percentage of the items the factory produces are defective. A quality control worker inspects and classifies each produced 
item and decides if it is "intact" and should be accepted, or a "defect" that should be rejected. The worker makes a decision, 
based on the vertical length of the rectangles. Intact items have a shorter mean length than defective items, but the two 
distributions overlap. Thus, when the worker observes the length of a rectangle, uncertainty remains if the item is intact or 
defective. Participants were told that the factory considers acquiring an alert system that will aid the worker in the 
classification task. The alert system classifies each item independently. The classification results appear as either a red 
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indication, when the system identifies a potentially defective item, or a green indication, when the system identifies an item 
as intact. The factory considers two optional alert systems, which may differ in their classification accuracy. Participants 
were told that their mission is to rate and compare the performance and contribution of the two candidate systems. 
Each participant performed 100 trials with each of the two alert systems, deciding on each trial whether or not to reject 
or to accept an item, based on the visual inspection of the item’s length and the binary indication given by the alert system. 
The 100 trials with each alert system were divided into two blocks, each with 50 trials. The participants were told that the 
first block of 50 trials was mainly for learning and gaining basic experience with their own abilities and the abilities of the 
alert system, and that their performance will be assessed according to their score in the second block. In each block, for 30 
trials the stimuli were sampled from the short distribution (intact items), and for 20 trials they were sampled from the long 
distribution (defective items), representing a probability of .4 for a defective item. The trials were individually randomized 
for each participant, alert response and block.  
Participants received 1 point for any correct rejection of a defective item (True Positive) or acceptance of an intact 
item (True Negatives). Participants lost 1 point for rejecting an intact item (False Positive) and lost 2 points for accepting 
a defective item (False Negative). This payoff scheme reflects a factory’s incentive not to deliver defective items to 
costumers, which is stronger than the incentive not to reject intact items. When a human conducts the classification task 
without the aid of the alert system, the optimal human response criterion for the above payoff scheme and .4 probability 
for a defective item, is βH =1 (see equation 4.) 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups, differing in the distributions of the rectangle lengths, 
characterizing human detection sensitivity, which was either d’H=1 (“less-accurate” human) or d’H=2.3 (“accurate” 
human). All participants saw alerts from both a “less accurate” system that had a detection sensitivity of d′A=1.0 and from 
an “accurate” system that had a detection sensitivity of d′A=2.3, in two parts of the experiment. Both alert systems used a 
response criterion of βA=1, which matches the participants’ optimal response criterion. The order of the systems was 
counterbalanced, so that half of the participants saw alerts from the accurate system in the first part and from the less-
accurate system in the second part, and the other half of the participants saw the systems in reversed order. Thus, there 
were four experimental subgroups in the experiment, created by combinations of two levels of the participant’s detection 
sensitivity (d′H = 1 and d′H = 2.3) and the order in which the participants examined the two types of alert systems (d′A = 1 
first or d′A = 2.3 first). Table 1 summarizes the outcome probabilities for the two systems and presents their positive and 
negative predictive values (PPV and NPV, respectively). These are the probabilities that an item was defective when the 
system indicated a defect (PPV) and that it was intact when the system indicated that it was intact (NPV). 
 
TABLE 1. Outcome probabilities for the two alert systems in Experiment 1 
Type of Alert Parameters Defect (Signal) Intact (Noise) PPV NPV 
 Red  
True Positive 
Green  
False Negative 
Red  
False Positive 
Green  
True Negative 
Less-Accurate d′A=1.0, β=1 69% 31% 31% 69% 60% 77% 
Accurate d′A=2.3, β=1 87% 13% 13% 87% 82% 91% 
 
After completing the trials with each alert system, participants filled out a questionnaire, providing their subjective 
judgments on the accuracy of the alert system and its contribution to their performance. In each question, the participants 
rated their level of agreement on a scale between 1 (not at all) and 7 (very much). Table 2 presents the questions and the 
factors to which they relate.  
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TABLE 2. Questions for the subjective assessment of the alert sensitivity, human sensitivity and human responsibility 
 
 
 
3.4. Results and Discussion 
3.4.1. Measured Responsibility 
According to the ResQu model, theoretical responsibility monotonically decreases in d'A and monotonically increases in 
d'H. We analyzed the measured responsibility with a three-way mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA), with human detection 
sensitivity and the order in which the alert systems were examined as between-subjects variables and the type of alert 
system as a within-subjects variable. There was no significant main effect of the order of experiencing the two alert systems, 
nor any significant interaction that involved the order. Thus, we focus on the results for the remaining two variables and 
their interaction (see Table 3 for the results). Fig. 4 depicts the mean values of empirical measured responsibility and the 
model’s predictions of the optimal theoretical values. 
 
TABLE 3. ANOVA results for Measured Responsibility 
 Effect on Measured Responsibility 
Variable F(1,56) MSE Par. η2 
d’A 122.84 **** 2.32 .69 
d’H 9.60 *** .35 .15 
d’A X d’H 1.61 .03 .03 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .005; **** p < .0001 
   
Factor Question # Question 
Alert detection 
sensitivity- d’A 
Q1 
 
The alert system could distinguish between intact and faulty items 
Human detection 
sensitivity- d’H Q2 
I could distinguish by myself (without the aid of the alert) between intact and faulty 
items 
Self 
Responsibility 
(Contribution to 
action selection) 
Q3 I used the indications from the alert to select an action  
Q4 
When selecting an action, I relied more on the indications from the alert system 
than on my own detection abilities 
Q5 
The alert system had a low contribution - I could have similar performance without 
it 
Responsibility of 
another agent 
 
Q6 
When aided by this alert system, a human remains responsible for the classification 
process  
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Fig. 4. Mean values for measured responsibility. Error bars represent 95% CI. Star icons indicate the optimal theoretical values from the 
ResQu model. 
 
As predicted by the ResQu model, both the human’s and the alert’s detection sensitivities had significant effects on 
the measured responsibility. The measured responsibility indeed decreased in d'A and increased in d'H.  All participants 
relied less on information from the less accurate alert system, leading to higher measured human responsibility with this 
system. In addition, the accurate participants tended to rely less on each alert system than the less accurate participants, so 
their measured responsibility with each system was higher.  
Fig. 4 shows that in most cases, the mean value of the measured responsibility was close to the optimal predicted 
theoretical value, except for the case in which the less accurate participants saw alerts from the accurate system. In this 
case, the less accurate participants assumed much higher-than-optimal responsibility.  
A difference between the measured responsibility and the optimal theoretical value can either be due to participants’ 
inadequate use of the information they have independently, or due to participants giving excessive or too little weight to 
the information from the alert. It is possible to distinguish between these two sources by analyzing the SDT measures - the 
effective d’ and the difference between cutoffs with and without the alert.  
Fig. 5 presents the optimal and mean empirical values for the effective d’ and the cutoff differences. Table 4 
summarizes the empirical deviations from theoretical predictions for both the ResQu model and SDT. 
 
Fig. 5. Mean empirical values for effective d’, and cutoff differences. Error bars represent 95% CI. The star icons indicate the optimal 
theoretical values of SDT. 
 
 
12                                                                                                                                                  N. Douer and J. Meyer 
 
TABLE 4. Theoretical predictions vs. empirical results 
Human Alert ResQu - Measured Responsibility SDT - Effective d’ SDT - Cutoffs Difference 
d’H d’A Theoretical Optimum 
Empiric 
Mean Differ. 
Theoretical 
Optimum 
Empiric 
Mean Differ. 
Theoretical 
Optimum 
Empiric 
Mean Differ. 
1 
1 69% 77% 8% 1.3 1.1 -0.2 1.6 1.2 -0.4 
2.3 12% 46% 34% 2.3 2.0 -0.3 3.9 2.0 -1.9 
2.3 
1 87% 85% -2% 2.3 2.1 -0.2 0.7 0.7 0 
2.3 47% 60% 13% 3.0 2.6 -0.4 1.7 1.1 -0.6 
 
In all combinations of human and alert detection sensitivities, the empirical effective d’ was lower than the 
corresponding optimal theoretical value by 10%-15%. Thus, participants did not optimally combine their own information 
with that of the alert system. In particular, with the accurate alert system, less accurate participants reached an effective d’ 
(2.0) that was lower than the sensitivity of the alert system (2.3). They would have fared better if they would have entirely 
ignored the continuous stimulus and responded only to the indications from the alert system.  
In most combinations of human and alert detection sensitivities, the cutoff difference was lower than the optimal value, 
implying that participants tended to under-trust the indications from the alert systems. The deviations from the optimal 
value were larger when participants saw the alerts from the accurate system, and was the largest when the less accurate 
participants used the accurate system. This deviation from the optimal value parallels that of the measured responsibility.  
To conclude, an analysis of traditional SDT measures of trust suggests that the deviation of the measured responsibility 
from the optimal theoretical value is mainly due to less accurate participants overestimating their own capabilities, 
compared to those of the accurate alert system. This led them to select non-optimal cutoff points and to use the information 
from the system in a non-optimal way. This result is in line with previous results from behavioral research in SDT [Bartlett 
and McCarley 2017, Maltz and Meyer 2001, Meyer 2001, Meyer et al, 2014], in which users tended to overestimate their 
own capabilities, especially when they performed poorly.  
3.4.2. Subjective self-responsibility 
Question Q1 referred to the subjective assessment of the alert’s detection sensitivity and question Q2 referred to the 
subjective assessment of the participant’s detection sensitivity. Questions Q3-Q5 referred to the participants’ subjective 
assessments of their own responsibility. We reverse-scored questions Q3 and Q4 for the score to reflect responsibility, and 
performed a reliability analysis to measure the consistency of the questions. The analysis showed high reliability, with 
Cronbach’s α = .87, so we used their average as an estimate for the subjective responsibility. 
We analyzed the different subjective assessments with three-way mixed analyses of variance (ANOVA), with human 
sensitivity and the order of the alert systems as between-subject variables, and the type of the alert system as a within-
subjects variable.  
The only significant effect involving the order of experiencing the two alert systems was the three-way interaction 
between order, human sensitivity and alert sensitivity F(1,56)= 6.81, MSE=8.53, Par. η2= .12, p =.01, in the subjective 
assessments of the alert’s detection sensitivity (question Q1). In this case, the order only had a significant effect on the 
accurate participants’ ratings of the performance of the less-accurate alert system. These participants assessed the 
performance of the less-accurate system to be better (average score of 5.2) when it was examined first, than when it was 
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examined second (average score of 3.1). The order had no significant effect on how the accurate participants rated the 
performance of the accurate alert system or how the less-accurate participants rated both systems.  
In all other questions, there was no significant main effect of the order, nor any significant interaction that involved 
the order. Thus, we focus on the results for the remaining two variables and their interactions. Table 5 summarizes the 
ANOVA results. 
 
TABLE 5. ANOVA results for questions Q1, Q2, Q3-Q5 
 
Q1- Subjective assessment of 
the alert’s 
 detection sensitivity 
Q2- Subjective assessment of 
the participant’s detection 
sensitivity 
Q3-Q5 - Subjective assessment 
of the participant’s 
responsibility 
Variable F(1,56) MSE Par. η2 F(1,56) MSE Par. η2 F(1,56) MSE Par. η2 
d’A 51.48**** 64.53 .48 1.72 1.87 .03 51.36**** 63.07 .48 
d’H 2.19 3.33 .04 14.72**** 18.41 .21 16.64**** 29.67 .23 
d’A X d’H 2.15 2.7 .04 .62 .68 .01 4.71* 5.78 .08 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 ; *** p < .005 ; **** p < .0001 
 
In the analysis of question Q1, the subjective assessment of the alert sensitivity, the only significant factor was the 
actual difference between the two alert systems. The accurate system was rated significantly higher (mean= 5.4, Sd= .14) 
than the less accurate system (mean= 3.9, Sd= .16). Thus, irrespective of their own sensitivity, all participants noticed that 
one system had a higher sensitivity. 
In the analysis of question Q2, the subjective assessment of participants' own detection sensitivities, only the actual 
difference between the detection sensitivities of the two participants groups was significant. The more accurate participants 
rated their detection abilities significantly higher (mean= 5.3, Sd= .14) than the less accurate participants (mean= 4.5, Sd= 
.14). Thus, participants were clearly able to evaluate their own performance, independently from the performance of the 
alert systems. 
The mean score for (reverse coded) questions Q3, Q4 and question Q5 reflected the participants’ subjective 
assessments of their own responsibility. In this case, both the human and the alert sensitivities had significant effects, as 
had the interaction. The accurate participants rated their responsibility with the accurate system significantly lower (mean= 
3.9, Sd= .21) than with the less accurate system (mean= 4.9, Sd= .23). The less accurate participants also rated their 
responsibility with the accurate system significantly lower (mean= 2.5, Sd= .21) than with the less accurate system (mean= 
4.3, Sd= .23). The interaction between the participants and the alert types is due to the less accurate participants 
differentiating more between the two types of alert systems.  
To conclude, in line with the theoretical predictions of the ResQu model, the subjective assessment of responsibility 
decreased in d'A and increased in d'H. In addition, the subjective assessment of responsibility was coherent with the 
subjective assessments made in Q1 and Q2 regarding the alert’s and the human’s sensitivities. 
The pattern of subjective responsibility scores resembles that of the measured responsibility To compare the two 
empirical results, we normalized the average scores of the two responsibilities. The normalized values of subjective 
responsibility were close to those of the measured responsibility (see Fig. 6). This implies that participants judged their 
marginal contribution with each alert system quite accurately.  
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Fig. 6. Normalized subjective responsibility (based on Q3-Q5) and measured responsibility 
 
3.4.3. Subjective own-responsibility vs. another person’s responsibility 
Question Q6 referred to the subjective assessment of another person’s responsibility. We compared this assessment to 
participants’ assessment of their own responsibility, as expressed in questions Q3-Q5, by conducting a four-way mixed 
analysis of variance (ANOVA), with human detection and the order of the alert systems as between-subject variables and 
the type of alert system and the type of responsibility as within-subjects variables. There was no significant main effect of 
the order of experiencing the two alert systems, nor any significant interaction that involved the order. Thus, we focus on 
reporting the results regarding the remaining variables and their interactions. Table 6 summarizes the results.  
 
TABLE 6. ANOVA results for subjective responsibility vs. another person’s responsibility 
 
Effect on subjective assessments of responsibility 
Variable 
F(1,56) MSE Par. η2 
d’A 
59.43**** 110.70 .51 
d’H 
12.42*** 29.17 .18 
Responsibility type 
106.15**** 115.28 .66 
d’A X d’H 
4.39* 8.20 .07 
Responsibility type X d’H 
4.88* 5.30 .08 
Responsibility type X d’A 
.64 .50 .01 
Responsibility type X d’A X d’H 
.37 .29 .01 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .005; **** p < .0001 
 
The human and the alert sensitivities and their interaction remained significant. Also, another person was seen as more 
responsible than oneself, and the difference was larger when the human sensitivity was lower, causing a significant 
interaction between the type of responsibility and human sensitivity (see Fig. 7). 
Theoretical, Measured and Subjective Responsibility in Aided Decision Making                                                       15 
 
Participants always rated their own responsibility as lower than that of another person in the same situation. This 
difference was particularly large when the human’s ability was low. Even when other humans were known to have limited 
abilities, the participants considered them to be about as responsible as a person with greater abilities. This finding 
resembles the “fundamental attribution error” in social psychology [Andrews 2001, Harman 1999, Ross 2018).  
 
 
Fig. 7. Mean values for questions Q6 and Q3,4 and 5. Error bars represent 95% CI. 
3.5. Conclusions for Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 showed that the ResQu model can serve as a descriptive model for both actual behavior (measured 
responsibility) and perceptions (subjective responsibility) at different combinations of the human’s and the alert’s detection 
sensitivities (d’H and d’A, respectively). 
Regarding the objectives of the experiment, the results showed that: 
(1) As predicted by the ResQu model, the alert system’s detection sensitivity (d'A) and the human’s detection 
sensitivity (d'H) had significant effects on both the measured and the subjective responsibilities, which were 
decreasing in d'A and increasing in d'H.  
(2) In most cases, the mean value of the measured responsibility was close to the optimal theoretical value, predicted 
by the ResQu model, except for the case in which the less accurate participants saw alerts from the accurate 
system. In this case, the less accurate participants assumed much higher-than-optimal responsibility. An analysis, 
based on SDT measures of trust, showed that these participants overestimated their own capabilities, compared to 
those of the accurate alert system, which led them to select non-optimal thresholds.   
(3)  The comparison of measured and subjective responsibilities shows that participants judged their marginal 
contribution with each alert system quite accurately. 
(4)  Participants assigned significantly higher subjective responsibility to the actions of another human then to 
themselves.   
In Experiment 1, both the participants and the alert’s design were based on the same evaluations of the payoff scheme 
and signal frequency, leading to the use of a similar response criterion. However, designers of alert systems may have 
perspectives and incentives that differ from those of the users, leading them to implement a different response criterion 
from the one the users adopt. Experiment 2 addresses the question how such differences affect responsibility. 
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4 EXPERIMENT 2: THE EFFECT OF 𝜷 ON HUMAN RESPONSIBILITY 
4.1 Introduction and Objectives 
The main determinants of human responsibility, according to the ResQu model, are the relative detection abilities of the 
alert system and the human. However, the responsibility also depends on the settings of the decision thresholds, used by 
the alert system and the human. The use of different decision thresholds by the system and the human reflects a situation 
in which the human and the system designers have different estimates of the costs and benefits associated with different 
outcomes or through different estimates of the signal and noise likelihoods.  
According to the ResQu model, when thresholds differ, the human usually has to take on more responsibility. The 
model predicts that even if the alert system has much better capabilities than the human (in terms of its detection sensitivity), 
but uses a considerably different response criterion, the human will rely much less on the system’s classification and will 
assume higher responsibility to compensate for the difference. This is a non-intuitive prediction of the theoretical model, 
which we examined in Experiment 2. Specifically, Experiment 2 examined the ability of the ResQu model to predict the 
effect of a large difference between the human’s and the alert system’s response criteria on measured and perceived 
responsibility. 
The objectives of the experiment were:  
(1) To examine whether a difference in the human’s and the alert’s response criterions has a significant effect on the 
measured and subjective responsibility, as predicted by the ResQu model (against the null hypothesis that it has 
no effect), and specifically that the human will rely less on an alert system which uses a considerably different 
response criterion than the human, leading to higher human responsibility with that system.  
(2) To examine how close the actual values of the empirical responsibility are to the theoretical predicted values and 
to analyze sources for differences by using SDT measures of trust (effective d’ and difference between cutoffs). 
(3)  To examine the relations between measured and subjective responsibilities. 
(4)  To examine whether the subjective responsibility estimates differ between self and another agent (against the null 
hypothesis that they do not).  
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Selection of Experimental points 
To examine the prediction of the theoretical model, we selected two experimental points, which differed considerably 
in the alert system’s response criteria. Both alert systems had a high detection sensitivity of d′A=2.3, but they differed in 
their response criterion. One system had a response criterion of βA=1, which matched the participant’s optimal response 
criterion (“Matching β”), that was similar to the one in Experiment 1, while the other used βA =0.03, reflecting considerably 
different incentives than those of the participants (“Different β”). All participants had a poor detection sensitivity (d’H=1), 
inferior to that of the alert systems. With the above settings, the ResQu model [Douer and Meyer 2019] predicts a theoretical 
responsibility value of 12% for the matching response criteria and 73% for the different response criteria.  
The above two experimental points also allow us to make a meaningful comparisons with the results in Experiment 1. 
The condition with different  criteria has a predicted theoretical responsibility of 73%, which is close to the theoretical 
responsibility of 69%, that was predicted in one of the experimental points in Experiment 1, which had a different 
combination of the system parameters but similar human parameters. It is therefore possible to compare the empirical 
responsibility values in both cases to see if they are also similar. Also, the condition with matching criteria is identical to 
an experimental point in Experiment 1 at which participants deviated substantially from the optimal theoretical value. 
Experiment 2 allows us to examine whether this deviation is replicated in another experiment. 
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4.2.2 Participants 
Participants were 30 students from Tel Aviv University (ages 20-34, median 25, 53% females), of which 28 were 
undergraduate students and 25 belonged to the faculty of engineering. The method of recruitment and the monetary reward 
for participation were the same as in Experiment 1. 
4.2.3. Apparatus, Procedure and Design 
The apparatus was identical to that of Experiment 1, and so were the prior information given to the participants, the 
participants’ payoff scheme, the rate of defective items, the number of trials with each of the two alert systems, and the 
questionnaires. All participants encountered both alert systems. We counterbalanced the order of the systems, with 15 
participants first seeing the alerts from the “matching β” system and then from the “different β” system, while the other 15 
saw the alert systems in the reversed order. Table 7 summarizes the outcome probabilities of the two alert systems in the 
experiment and the systems’ positive and negative predictive values.   
TABLE 7. Outcome Probabilities for the different Alert systems in the of β effect Experiment 
Type of Alert Parameters Defective (Signal) Intact (Noise) PPV NPV 
 Red  
True Positive 
Green  
False Negative 
Red  
False Positive 
Green  
True Negative 
Matching β d′A=2.3, βA=1 87% 13% 13% 87% 82% 91% 
Different β d′A=2.3, βA =0.03 99.6% 0.4% 65% 35% 51% 99% 
 
The alert system with a matching β had the same parameters as the accurate alert system in Experiment 1. The alert 
system with a different β reflected a much higher incentive to reduce the acceptance of defective units (False Negatives). 
This came at the price of an increase in the rate of False Positives (false alarms). Due to the rate of defective items, whenever 
this alert system indicated an intact item, there was a 99% chance that it was indeed intact. On the other hand, this system’s 
PPV was only 51%, so in just about half of the cases when the system indicated a defective item, it was indeed defective.  
4.3. Results and Discussion 
4.3.1. Measured Responsibility 
The ResQu model predicts that when the alert’s response criterion differs considerably from that of the human, the 
human will tend to assume greater responsibility, due to the differences between the incentives in selecting an action.  
We analyzed the measured human responsibility with a two-way mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA), with the order 
in which the alert systems were examined as a between-subjects variable and the type of alert system as a within-subjects 
variable. As in Experiment 1, there were no significant effects of the order of experiencing the two alert systems. As 
predicted by the ResQu model, the changes in the response criterion had a significant effect. Participants relied less on the 
information generated by the alert system with a different response criterion, leading to significantly higher measured 
responsibility with that system (mean= .85, Sd= .02), compared to the alert system with a matching response criterion 
(mean= .43, Sd= .04), F(1,28)= 110.43, MSE=2.7, Par. η2= .80, p < .0001.  
We also compared the mean values of empirical measured responsibility against the model’s predictions of the optimal 
theoretical values. When using the alert system with a different response criterion, the mean value of the measured 
responsibility (85%) was close to the theoretical prediction (73%). However, when using the alert system with a matching 
response criterion, the mean value of the measured responsibility (43%) deviated substantially from the optimal theoretical 
value (12%).  
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For the case with a different response criterion, the theoretical model predicts a theoretical responsibility of 73%, 
which is close to the theoretical responsibility of 69%, that is predicted in one of the experimental points of  Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, with human and alert sensitivities of d’H= d′A=1 and response criteria βA= βH = 1, the predicted theoretical 
responsibility was 69% and the measured responsibility was 77%. For the experimental point in Experiment 2, in which 
the human parameters were identical, but the alert sensitivity was d′A=2.3 and its response criterion was βA =0.03, the 
predicted theoretical responsibility was 73% and the measured responsibility was 85%. Hence, we see that the empirical 
results, across the two experiments, are coherent. When a human with given capabilities worked with two different systems 
(in terms of detection sensitivity and response criterion), for which the theoretical model predicted similar responsibility 
values, the empirical measured responsibility was also similar.  
For the case with a matching response criterion, measured responsibility (43%) was very close to the one observed in 
the corresponding identical experimental point in Experiment 1 (46%), in which the less accurate participants saw alerts 
from the accurate system. Therefore, the empirical deviation from the optimum in Experiment 2 replicated the 
corresponding deviation in Experiment 1.    
We investigated the sources for deviations of the measured responsibility from the optimal theoretical value by 
analyzing the SDT measures effective d’ and cutoff difference (see Table 8 for the optimal and mean empirical values). In 
both alert systems, the empirical effective d’ was lower than the corresponding maximal value, implying that participants  
did not optimally utilize the information from the alert system. With both alert systems, the cutoff difference was lower 
than the corresponding optimal theoretical value, implying that participants tended to under-trust the two alert systems.  
 
TABLE 8. Theoretical predictions vs. empirical results 
 ResQu - Measured 
Responsibility 
SDT - Effective d’ SDT - Cutoffs Difference 
Alert Response 
criterion β 
Theoretical 
Optimum 
Empirical 
Mean 
Diff. Theoretical 
Optimum 
Empirical 
Mean 
Diff. Theoretical 
Optimum 
Empirical 
Mean 
Diff. 
Different β  
(βA = 0.03) 
73% 85% 12% 1.4 1.0 -0.4 5.0 0.7 -4.3 
Matching β  
(βA = 1) 
12% 43% 31% 2.3 2.0 -0.3 3.9 2.0 -1.9 
Detection Sensitivities: Human d’H=1; Alert d’A=2.3 
 
At first, there seems to be an inconsistency between the deviations of the measured responsibility and the cutoff 
difference from their optimal values. The measured responsibility deviated more for the alert system with the matching 
response criterion, but the cutoff difference deviated more for the alert system with a different response criterion. The 
inconsistency may be explained by refining the analysis of the participants’ behavior, by analyzing their levels of reliance 
and compliance. Table 9 summarizes the analysis. 
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TABLE 9. Theoretical SDT predictions Vs. Empirical result 
Alert System Different Response Criterion (β =0.03) Matching Response Criterion (β =1) 
 Reliance Compliance Trust Reliance Compliance Trust 
 Cutoff point for 
a Green 
indicator 
Cutoff point 
for a Red 
indicator 
Cutoff 
difference 
Cutoff point 
for a Green 
indicator 
Cutoff point 
for a Red 
indicator 
Cutoff 
difference 
Probability for 
indicator color 
20% 80% -- 57% 43% -- 
Theoretical cutoff 4.6 -0.4 5 1.95 -1.95 3.9 
Empirical cutoff 0.6 -0.1 0.7 1 -1 2 
Difference  
(Theory Vs Empiric) 
4 -0.3 4.3 0.95 -0.95 1.9 
 
For the alert system with a matching response criterion, there were similar levels of under-reliance and under-
compliance, so with both types of alert indications, participants deviated quite substantially from the optimal theoretical 
value (by .95), leading to a cutoff difference of 1.9.  
For the alert system with a different response criterion, the situation is quite different, as the optimal theoretical cutoff 
setting is asymmetrical (4.6 and -.4 respectively), due to a large difference between its NPV and PPV values (see Table 7). 
With this system, participants only deviated considerably from the optimal value when the alert indicator was green 
(Difference = 4) but used an almost optimal value when it was red (Difference = -.3). Thus, the difference between the 
theoretical predictions and the empirical behavior is mainly due to participants’ under-reliance.  It is important to note that 
with this system, in 80% of the trials participants saw a red indication and therefore behaved close to the theoretical 
prediction. In this respect, the standard SDT measure of cutoff difference is misleading with this system, as it does not take 
into account the relative probabilities for the occurrence of reliance and compliance.  
From the above we can see that with the alert system that used a different response criterion, in 80% of the trials the 
participants deviated only slightly from the optimal value (by .3), while they deviated quite considerably (by .95) in all 
trials with the alert system that used a matching  response criterion. Therefore, in 80% of the trials, the participants deviated 
much more with the alert system that used a matching response criterion.  
To conclude, after considering the relative probabilities for the occurrence of reliance and compliance, we see that 
there is consistency between the deviations of measured responsibility and the cutoff difference from their optimal values. 
The participants assumed much higher-than-optimal responsibility with the system that used a matching response criterion. 
The analysis, based on SDT measures of trust, showed that these participants overestimated their own capabilities, which 
led them to select of non-optimal cutoffs, due to both under-reliance and under-compliance.  
The above analysis also demonstrates that the ResQu model’s measure of responsibility has some advantages over 
SDT measures that are used to analyze human trust. The ResQu model’s measure of responsibility, which is based on 
entropy, considers the different base probabilities for signals, alert indications, and the human responses, given the signals 
and indications, and reflects the share of unique human contribution to the outcomes in a single easily interpretable value. 
Conversely, the SDT measure of absolute cutoff difference might be misleading, as it does not consider the relative 
probabilities for the occurrence of reliance and compliance behaviors. 
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4.3.2. Subjective self-responsibility  
Questions Q3-Q5 referred to the participants’ subjective assessments of their own responsibility. We reverse-scored 
questions Q3 and Q4 for the score to reflect responsibility. A reliability analysis, using Cronbach’s α showed α = .82. 
Hence we used the mean of the three questions as a measure for the subjective responsibility. 
We analyzed the different types of subjective assessments with a two-way mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA), with 
the type of alert system as a within-subject variable and the order in which the alert systems were examined as a between-
subject variable. There was no significant effect of the order of experiencing the two alert systems, so we focus on reporting 
the result regarding the effects of the alert response criteria. 
Question Q1 referred to the subjective assessment of the alert system’s detection ability. The ability of the system with 
a matching response criterion was rated significantly higher (mean= 5.9, Sd= .13) than the system with a different response 
criterion (mean= 3.6, Sd= .24), F(1,28)= 57.29, MSE=77.07, Par. η2= .67, p < .0001. 
Question Q2 referred to subjective assessment of the participant’s own detection sensitivity. The participants rightly 
perceived their own detection ability as the same with both alert systems (Mean= 4.2, Sd= .21 and Mean= 4.1, Sd= .23 for 
the alert system with the different and the matching response criteria, respectively), F(1,28)= .14, MSE=.15, Par. η2= .01, 
p =.71. 
The mean score for (reverse coded) questions Q3, Q4 and question Q5 reflected subjective assessment of human 
responsibility. As predicted by the ResQu model, the participants assessed that they had less responsibility with the system 
with the matching response criterion (mean= 2.3, Sd= .16) and significantly more responsibility with the system with the 
different response criterion (mean= 4.2, Sd= .22), F(1,28)= 53.4, MSE=54.78, Par. η2= .66, p < .0001. This result is 
consistent with the subjective assessments expressed in Q1 and Q2 regarding the alert’s and the human’s performance. 
As in Experiment 1, the normalized average values of subjective responsibility were close to those of the measured 
responsibility. For the system with the matching response criterion, the average normalized subjective responsibility was 
-1.8 and the normalized measured responsibility was -1.6. For the system with the different response criterion, the 
normalized subjective responsibility was 0.4 and the normalized measured responsibility was 1.1. This implies that here, 
too, participants judged their level of marginal contribution with each alert system quite accurately.  
4.3.3. Subjective own responsibility vs. another person’s responsibility 
Question Q6 referred to the subjective assessment of another person’s responsibility. We compared this assessment to 
participants’ assessment of their own responsibility with each alert system, as expressed in questions Q3, Q4 and Q5, by 
conducting a three-way mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA), with the order of the alert systems as a between-subject 
variable and the type of alert system and type of responsibility as within-subjects variables. There was no significant main 
effect of the order of experiencing the two alert systems, nor any significant interaction that involved the order condition. 
Thus, we focus on reporting the result regarding the remaining variables and their interactions (see Table 10 for the 
results).   
TABLE 10. ANOVA results for subjective responsibility self (Q3-Q5) vs. another person (Q6) 
 Effect on subjective responsibility assessments 
Variable F(1,28) MSE Par. η2 
βA 29.25**** 69.51 .51 
Responsibility type 30.51**** 51.57 .52 
Responsibility type X βA 7.28* 4.53 .20 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .005; **** p < .0001 
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Participants always rated their own responsibility as lower than that of another person in the same situation. The 
difference was particularly large for the system with a matching response criterion (see Fig. 8).  
 
Fig. 8. Subjective assessment values for questions Q6 and Q345. Error bars represent 95% CI. 
5.3. Conclusions for Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 showed that the ResQu model can describe how differences between the human and the alert response criteria 
affect both actual behavior (measured responsibility) and perceptions (subjective responsibility). 
Regarding the objectives of the experiment, the results shows that: 
(1) As predicted by the ResQu model, the difference between the human and automation response criteria had a 
significant effect on the measured and subjective responsibility. The human relied much less on the alert system 
which used a considerably different response criterion, leading to higher responsibility with that system. 
(2)  As in Experiment 1, the mean value of the measured responsibility deviated from the optimal theoretical value, 
when the less accurate participants saw alerts from the accurate system. In this case, the less accurate participants 
assumed higher-than-optimal responsibility. The analysis, based on SDT measures of trust, showed that these 
participants overestimated their own capabilities, which led them to select non-optimal cutoffs, due to both under-
reliance and under-compliance.  
(3) Comparison of measured and subjective responsibilities shows that participants judged their marginal contribution 
with each alert system quite accurately. 
(4)  Participants assigned significantly higher subjective responsibility to the actions of another person then to 
themselves.   
 
5 DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK 
5.1 Main Results 
In two laboratory experiments, in which participants performed an aided classification task, we compared the theoretical 
predictions of the ResQu model to the actual measured responsibility participants took on and to their subjective rankings 
of responsibility.  
As predicted by the ResQu model, the relative classification abilities of the participants and the alert systems (i.e. their 
relative detection sensitivities) had a significant effect on both the measured and subjective responsibility, which decreased 
as the system’s ability improved and increased as the participants’ ability improved.  In addition, as predicted by the model, 
even when the alert system had much better abilities than the participants, but used a considerably different response 
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criterion, the participants relied much less on the system and assumed higher responsibility, to compensate for the 
difference in the incentives for action selection. In most cases, the mean value of the measured responsibility was close to 
the optimal theoretical value predicted by the ResQu model. Lastly, when participants worked with two much different 
alert systems for which the ResQu model predicted similar responsibility values, they assumed similar empirical 
responsibility, as predicted by the model.  
The theoretical responsibility values and the mean empirical values across the two experiments were strongly 
correlated. The Pearson correlation coefficient between theoretical and subjective responsibility was r=0.983, p<.0001, 
and the nonparametric Spearman correlation coefficient was rs=0.971, p=.001. The Pearson correlation coefficient between 
theoretical and subjective responsibility was r=0.984, p<.0001 and the Spearman correlation coefficient was rs=0.928, 
p<.01. In line with the above correlations, there was also a significant strong correlation between the measured and 
subjective responsibility with r=0.943, p<.01 and  rs=0.900, p=.015 which shows that participants subjectively judged 
their marginal contribution with each system quite accurately. 
The ResQu model generally provided quite accurate predictions of the actual values of measured responsibility. A  
relatively large bias existed only when participants with poor capabilities used a system with much superior capabilities. 
In this case, the participants overestimated their own capabilities, relied less-than-optimally on the system and, thus, 
assumed greater-than-optimal responsibility. Another bias we found, was a systematic tendency to subjectively attribute 
more responsibility to another person than to oneself in the same situation, in a manner that resembles aspects of the 
“fundamental attribution error”. 
To conclude, the results demonstrated that the ResQu model is not only a theoretical model for quantifying human 
responsibility in interactions with intelligent systems and advanced automation, but also a descriptive model that allows us 
to predict human’s measured and subjective responsibility. One can consider the characteristics of the human, the system 
and the environment, and systematic behavioral deviations, and compute a ResQu value that can serve to assess the actual 
human responsibility or how humans will perceive their own responsibility.  
In addition, the results also showed that the ResQu model’s measure of responsibility, which is based on entropy and 
considers the different base probabilities for the signal, the alert indications, and the resulting human responses, has some 
advantages over other SDT measures that are used to analyze human trust in aided decision making. It reflects the share of 
unique human contribution to the outcomes in one easily interpretable value, and thus it is well suited to serve as a new 
measure for quantifying user trust and involvement in intelligent systems. 
5.2 Discussion 
Our results imply that introducing better automation into an existing system will almost necessarily lower the human 
responsibility and level of involvement. Users of systems with capabilities that greatly exceed their own, may feel 
(correctly) that they have no significant impact on the system, and may attempt to be more involved by interfering more 
than necessary or conversely feel less motivated to take necessary actions [Hassenzahl and Klapperich 2014, Rangarajan, 
et al. 2005, Smith et al. 1999]. Both responses will probably impair the overall performance of the system. One needs to 
be aware of these changes and be prepared to deal with the implications they may have on the functioning of the system 
and on the humans’ attitudes towards the system and their role in it. The ResQu model enables system designers to identify 
such cases in advance and take them into consideration when planning the human role in the system (e.g. by assigning the 
human additional meaningful duties).    
Our results also showed a systematic tendency to attribute more responsibility to another person than to oneself. This 
implies that an outside observer, such as a manager, might attribute more responsibility to a person who uses an advanced 
intelligent system than the person actually has. This, in turn, may lead to unjustifiably holding humans responsible for 
Theoretical, Measured and Subjective Responsibility in Aided Decision Making                                                       23 
 
adverse outcomes in situations in which they rightly trusted the system. The ResQu model may be used to quantify and 
present the actual marginal level of human contributions, and it thereby helps to calibrate such exogenous responsibility 
attributions.  
In addition, our results imply that human operators may have only limited causal responsibility for the outcomes when 
they interact with advanced intelligent systems, the. This may create discrepancy between role responsibility (i.e. the duties 
of the human operator, he or she are held accountable for) and causal responsibility which describes the actual human 
contribution to system outcomes. This inconsistency can derive from two sources. First, humans may lack the authority to 
take the actions necessary to fulfill their role, and thus may have limited ability to influence the system outcomes. This is 
known as responsibility-authority double binds [Woods 1985, Woods, 2004]. Secondly, since causal responsibility is 
measured in respect to the outcomes, it is influenced by uncertainties and probabilistic aspects that are not part of authority 
(which is defined explicitly and granted beforehand). Thus, there could be cases, in which the human is granted sufficient 
authority, but due to probabilistic factors related to the environment and the automation and to the automation design, the 
human’s actions may have only minor marginal influence on the probability distribution of the outcomes. In either case, 
the human may be considered fully legally responsible for adverse outcomes, even when not having sufficient control to 
prevent them or when contributing very little to create these outcomes. 
System designers often keep humans in the loop to supervise the automation and to handle unexpected events, even 
when the human may have limited abilities to do so. Our results demonstrate that simply putting a human into the loop 
does not assure that the human will have a meaningful role and unique contribution to the process. A prominent example 
are provisions regarding automated decision making in the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which says 
in Article 22(1): “The data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, 
including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly significantly affects him or her.” The 
interpretation of this article states that it constitutes a general prohibition for decision making, based solely on automated 
processing. This means that to conform to the GDPR requirements, institutions will have to involve humans in automated 
decision processes. Realistically speaking, these humans will, of course, base their decisions largely on information from 
decision support systems. Thus, despite the seeming adherence to the requirement not to fully automate the decision 
process, the actual comparative human responsibility, according to the ResQu model, will likely be minimal. Here, again, 
organization should consider the true added value of the human to system processes, beyond the simple role of approving 
system decisions. One needs to specify what it actually means to have meaningful human control in a given context. 
With the advent of advanced intelligent systems, with abilities that clearly exceed those of humans in many critical 
functions, a choice will have to be made. One can progress to autonomous systems with very little human involvement, or 
alternatively maintain a certain level of human involvement at the price of lowering system performance. The decision 
whether one wants to sacrifice the full potential of system performance in order to increase human involvement and 
responsibility, will have to be made on a case-by-case basis by regulators and system designers. The insights, gained from 
using the ResQu model can support this process. 
The intermediate option, where systems will be increasingly intelligent, while still keeping the human in the loop, can 
possibly lead to the inclusion of humans to simply fulfill regulatory requirements without them having any real added value 
for system performance. Falsely claiming that the human is responsible for adverse outcomes of the system may expose 
her or him to unjustified legal liability and to the psychological burden of self-blaming, even when the person actually 
contributed very little to the outcomes. The three types of responsibility measures, which were introduced in the current 
study, can potentially be used in legal procedures, by exposing anomalies and providing a new method to quantify the 
actual human comparative responsibility for the outcomes. Each measure may be used in a different context. The theoretical 
responsibility measure is the most appropriate when one wants to specify the optimal human involvement in a system. 
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Nevertheless, it quantifies the responsibility of a perfectly rational human, and as such it does not necessarily provide 
adequate descriptions of what humans will actually do. The measured responsibility may be the best predictor of how the 
’average person’ behaves when interacting with a system. Finally, the subjective responsibility reflects the impressions of 
people involved in using the system have regarding the responsibility of different humans. The analysis of the three types 
of the above responsibility measures can perhaps lead to a change in the legal treatment of human responsibility in 
intelligent systems and automation.  
5.3 Limitations and Future Work  
The study was conducted in a controlled lab environment, using a simple, abstract experimental setting, in which 
participants performed a simple task and received immediate feedback on their performance. This experimental setting 
allowed us to control the relevant independent variables and to compare the results to the theoretical responsibility 
predictions of the ResQu model, while still capturing central properties of human interaction with decision support systems. 
Nevertheless, the lab experiment may not fully represent complex human interactions with intelligent systems in real-world 
environments. Thus, future work should expand the research by applying the ResQu model to real-world settings. 
The empirical study was limited to Israeli students, of which most were undergraduate students from the faculty of 
engineering. This sample population may not fully reflect cultural or educational effects on the degree to which people 
take and judge responsibility. Future work should examine whether, and to what degree, cultural and educational 
differences affect measured and subjective responsibility.  
It is important to note that the three responsibility measures focus on estimating the mean share of unique human 
contribution to the outcomes, averaged over the distributions of possible states in the environment, automation performance 
and human responses. As such, they do not deal with the retrospective evaluation of human responsibility in a specific 
single past event. Such an analysis deals with retrospective responsibility (in contrast to the prospective analysis we present 
in our paper). Retrospective responsibility is very important in the contexts of identifying causal sequences leading to 
outcomes, finding fault and perusing legal justice, and it is an important topic for future work.  
Future work should also address temporal effects, such as the time required to make a decision and its implications on 
the human’s tendency to rely on the automation and on the corresponding measures of theoretical, measured and subjective 
responsibility. We plan to address this issue, too, in future work. 
 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
Advanced automation and intelligent systems have become ubiquitous and are major parts of our life. As these intelligent 
systems become more advanced, the human comparative causal responsibility for the outcomes becomes equivocal. 
In this paper we analyzed the descriptive abilities of a newly developed theoretical model of human responsibility to 
predict actual human behavior in laboratory interactions with an automated decision aid. In two lab experiments we 
compared the theoretical responsibility values to the actual measured responsibility a person took on and to the subjectively 
perceived responsibility, for various combinations of human and automation characteristics.  
Our results showed that the ResQu model is not only a theoretical model, but also a descriptive model that allows us 
to predict human’s measured and subjective responsibility. One can consider the characteristics of the human, the system 
and the environment, and systematic behavioral deviations, and compute a ResQu value that can serve to assess the actual 
human responsibility or how humans will perceive their own responsibility.  
Our study has far-reaching implication. When humans interact with intelligent systems and advanced automation with 
capabilities that exceed those of the human, it is almost inevitable that the unique human contribution (i.e. the ResQu model 
responsibility) will be small, even if formally the human is assigned major roles. Simply putting a human into the loop 
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does not assure that the human will have a meaningful part in the process. We do not advocate or criticize certain ways to 
involve humans in a process. Rather, our model describes human involvement in processes and quantifies the comparative 
causal responsibility of the human for outcomes, given the properties of the situation. This analysis should be part of the 
evaluation of different system design alternatives.  
A specific design may give humans a more central role in a process, but this may come at the prize of limiting the use 
of the capabilities the automation may have to offer. Similarly, introducing better automation into an existing system will 
almost necessarily lower human responsibility and involvement. One needs to be aware of these changes and be prepared 
to deal with the implications they may have on the functioning of the system and on the humans’ attitudes towards the 
system and their role in it.  
The predictive and descriptive abilities of the ResQu model can be applied by system designers and regulators to 
estimate human responsibility in specific configurations of automation levels and types of human control, in events 
involving AI, decision support systems and advanced automation. The model can serve for comparisons between system 
design alternatives or deployment policies, by relating different automation design options to their predicted effects on the 
users’ behavior and perceptions of responsibility, and guide policy and legal decisions regarding human responsibility.  
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